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13 January 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Bloc-Cuba: New trade protocols between Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc are now being negotiated. Cuban trade with the bloc is expected to amount to over \$1 billion in 1962. Last year such trade amounted to some \$850,000,000 and accounted for about three quarters of Cuba's total foreign trade. Under an agreement signed on 9 January, Cuban trade with the USSR alone is scheduled to increase from about \$550,000,000 in 1961 to \$700,000,000 in 1962. This will make Cuba Moscow's fifth-ranking world trading partner, following East Germany, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Havana's trade with nonbloc countries, led by the US, Canada, and Japan, amounted to about \$250,000,000 last year and is still a vital source of certain industrial and agricultural imports. [redacted]

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Thailand: Prime Minister Sarit as well as Foreign Minister Thanat and other high officials are becoming increasingly restive over Western policy on Laos and also the delays they feel they have met in obtaining firm commitments on future United States economic and military aid to Thailand. According to Ambassador Young, the United States is now "losing real ground in Thai official circles and in public." Thanat and the prime minister, who oppose plans for a coalition government headed by Souvanna Phouma in Laos, reportedly cannot understand US acceptance of Soviet guarantees given at Geneva and suspect that the United States is yielding to pressures from its European allies. Thanat [redacted] does not know what the ruling group in Thailand may do as a result of "the disappointing letdown by the Americans." [redacted]

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
DAILY BRIEF

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Japan - South Korea: The Japanese Foreign Ministry has indicated to US officials that Tokyo may offer about \$70,000,000 in settlement of South Korean property claims. Seoul has advanced publicly a claim for \$1.2 billion but has confidentially implied a minimum bargaining figure of \$500,000,000. The difficulty of resolving the claims dispute appears to have prompted the Foreign Ministry to recommend that Japanese efforts be made to negotiate a general economic cooperation agreement with South Korea rather than a settlement of claims accompanied by the extension of credits and grants. One factor in Prime Minister Ikeda's unwillingness to assume a large financial obligation to South Korea is Japan's adverse international balance of payments.

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The Situation in Angola

There has been little fighting in northern Angola in recent months. Portuguese troops now occupy most of the towns and can defend themselves against rebel harassment along the roads with minimal losses to themselves. However, at their present strength of 32,000 they have not been able to eliminate rebel activity. The rebels are aided by the difficult terrain, by the poor communications, and by heavy rains which make large-scale Portuguese military movements almost impossible.

[REDACTED]

The Portuguese forces have undertaken a "psycho-social" campaign among the Africans of the region. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Some elements of the army apparently believe that the Africans have been exploited by the white population; they are engaging in welfare and educational work to restore the natives' loyalty. The American consul general in Luanda comments, however, that the effectiveness of this campaign depends entirely on the zeal of the local company commanders, only two of whom are known to have exerted much effort in this activity. Moreover, white civilians, both public officials and private citizens, have been alienated by the army's arrogation of authority to itself. The army men involved admit that the program's effect on the Africans themselves may not be lasting.

The consul general concludes that the existing program is "pitifully limited," in view of the task to be accomplished if the campaign is to succeed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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